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The British Industrial Relations 
An Analysis 
T. G. Whittingham 
B. Towers 
In this paper, the authors attempt to analyse the 
government intention and to assess some of the possible 
implications of the proposed measures in the British govern-
ment's industrial relations Bill passed on December 8, 1970. 
The appearance of the British Government's Industrial Relations 
Bill on 8th December, 1970 marked a new departure in the industrial 
relations system. In the real sensé of the term the Bill is revolutionary 
and charts a new course for the British system of industrial relations. It is 
likely to be converted into an Act with very few changes, since the 
Government has made it quite clear that it will not be diverted from its 
purposes as laid down in the Bill. It is highly relevant, therefore, at this 
point in time to analyse the Government's intentions and to assess some 
of the possible implications of the proposed measures.1 
An analysis of the Government's intentions can, for the sake of con-
veniance, be broken down into three parts, although in practice thèse 
three parts are interrelated. We intend to examine the philisophy which 
seems to lie behind the proposais ; the objectives which stem from this 
philosophy and the means chosen to implement thèse objectives. 
It is frequently difficult to discover the philosophy lying behind 
législative proposais, but, in this case, we hâve had several clear philoso-
phical statements of which the most 
important is that made by Mr. Carr 
in the House of Commons on Mon-
day, 14th December, 1970. «Unfet-
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tered freedom destroys itself. Liberty cannot be maintained nor rights 
sustained without corresponding duties. » He went on to point out that as 
Personal and group activities impinged more and more upon other people's 
rights, they become more formai and when they affect the whole of com-
munity they become a matter for the law. Speaking specifically about the 
Bill, Mr. Carr said, « This Bill is essentially about the eternal tension bet-
ween the désire of the individual person and individual group for complète 
freedom of action and need for the community to hâve proper degree of 
order and discipline ». 2 Apart from this gênerai statement, other more 
spécifie aspects of the conservative philosophy appear in Fair Deal at 
Work. In his préface to the document, the Prime Minister wrote : « This 
report shows how in industry responsible management and trade unionism 
can make a more constructive contribution to the development and ad-
vancement of Britain's economy. It shows, too, how within properly defined 
rules individuals and organisations can be free to get on with the job 
without interférence by the Government. It will form the basis of Conser-
vative policies to provide Britain's industrial life with a new framework 
of rights and obligations > 3. 
Within the context of parliamentary democracy such philosophical 
statements are far from revolutionary since freedom within the law is an 
axiomatic principle of démocratie societies. However, in the context of 
the British system of industrial relations the introduction of this philosophy 
is indeed a radical departure from an accepted tradition which began about 
a century ago. The traditional rôle of the law in British industrial relations 
has been summarised as follows. « Traditionally, in the United Kingdom, 
the law has followed two lines of gênerai policy, one of non-intervention 
(for example, collective agreements are not legally enforceable between 
employers' associations and trade unions) ; the other of giving immunities 
in certain areas of the law when normally illégal action is taken in con-
templation of furtherance of a trade dispute (for example, inducement to 
breach of contract is not actionable).4 Hence, it is possible to perceive 
the philosophy in two ways. Firstly, it can be seen as no more than an 
extension of the rôle of the law in a démocratie society to an area formerly 
partially immune. Secondly, however, it can equally be seen as a radical 
new departure - the intrusion of the law into a sub-system of society in 
2 Quoted in The Financial Times, Tuesday, 15th December 1970. 
3 Published by Conservative Political Centre, March 1968. 
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which it has previously played only a minor rôle with the gênerai consent 
of the actors. Given this second view, it is not surprising that sonne of the 
actors in the system hâve reacted strongly. Thus, for example, the T.U.C. 
has commented, « It ill becomes a government which claims to be con-
cerned with enlarging freedom that its first major political act should be 
to make activities unlawful that for a 100 years Parliament and the Courts 
hâve upheld as right and proper, and to establish an array of new State 
agencies ».5 On the other hand, there is some tentative évidence to suggest 
that public opinion (including trade union members) is not wholly on 
support of the second view. For example, a poil conducted by Opinion 
Research Centre for the Sunday Times between lOth December and 14th 
December 1970, on the basis of a quota sample of 994, found that 47 per 
cent of the 'public at large' 48 per cent of union members approuved the 
Bill while 32 per cent of both union members and the public opposed it. 6 
It can be seen that the Government's philosophical position is clearly 
delineated as are also the reasons for the reaction of the T.U.C. Equally 
clear are the Government's objectives. Without doubt the fundamental 
objective is to strengthen the economy. For example, Mr. Heath has said 
that the Bill is necessary « for our industrial health and for an expanding 
economy ». Additionally, he argued that the législation is vital for dealing 
with the underlying problems inhérent in the pressures of the collective 
bargaining system which he defined as inflation and the conséquences of 
industrial disputes and disruption. 7 This speech is an obvious reflection of 
the Consultative Document in which it is argued that, « Poor industrial 
relations adversely affect output, raise industrial costs, damage the balance 
4
 T. G. WHITTINGHAM and A. W. GOTTSCHALK, « Proposais for Change in the 
British System of Industrial Relations - an Evaluation » The Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Sydney, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 1970, p. 54. 
5 Industrial Relations Bill, Statement by the T.U.C. General Council, 15th 
October 1970. 
6
 Reported in The Sunday Times, December 20th, 1970. Perhaps hère we should 
state the obvious. Firstly, the sample size is far too small to make safe generaliza-
tions. Secondly, the poil was taken during the electricity supply workers' work-to-rule 
and overtime ban. 
7
 Mr. Heath in the House of Commons on the second day of the debate on the 
Bill, 15th December, 1970. 
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of payments, and inhibit industrial investment » 8 Hère it should be added 
that the Consultative Document mentions social as well as économie objec-
tives but the social objectives hâve not been given the same importance in 
explanatory speeches. 
However, despite the inhérent problems of définition and the resulting 
implications and, assuming that the Govemment's overriding objective is 
économie, what are the spécifie operational objectives which it proposes). 
Thèse objectives are listed in paragraph 10 of the Consultative Document 
as follows : 
i) to set national standards for good industrial relations ; 
ii) to safeguard those who conform to them ; 
iii) to protect individual rights in employment ; 
iv) to provide new methods of resolving disputes over the conduct 
of industrial relations. 9 
Given thèse, at least admirably clear, objectives, we can now examine 
the chosen means for achieving thèse ends. 
It would seem, from an analysis of speeches made by Mr. Heath, 
Mr. Carr and Sir Geoffrey Howe,10 that the following means are the 
principal ones chosen to achieve the objectives already outlined : 
8
 Industrial Relations Bill, Consultative Document, D.E.P. October 1970, para. 
3. This is perhaps the most doubtful statement in the whole document. Apart from 
the problem of defining 'good' and 'bad' industrial relations both practitioners and 
students are aware that cause and effect are not so easily established. Economie 
Systems, at ail levels, are far too complex to explain différences in performance and 
efficiency on industrial relations grounds alone since there are far more variables 
to be taken into account. In some cases industrial relations may be a relatively 
unimportant variable in this context. Unfortunately, there is a shortage of sound 
empirical évidence to validate or reject any hypotesis which could be advanced. One 
micro study, which présents évidence which may réfute the Govemment's apparent 
hypothesis, is of some interest. See T. LUPTON, On the Shop Floor, PERGAMON 
PRESS, 1963. 
9 lbid., para. 10. 
10
 The speeches used for this analysis are : 
a) Mr. Heath in the House of Commons on the second day of the debate on 
the Bill, 15th December, 1970. 
b) Mr. Carr moving the Second Reading of the Bill on 14th December, 1970. 
c) Sir Geoffrey Howe speaking to the Industrial Society at Glasgow on 8th 
December, 1970. 
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i) to reform the collective bargaining system ; 
ii) to strengthen the trade unions ; 
iii) to curtail strike action ; 
iv) to safeguard individual rights. n 
But this is not spécifie enough for our purposes since such gênerai state-
ments do not highlight individual aspects of the Bill. On the other hand, 
a detailed analysis of the Bill by itself might lead to a confusion of détail, 
hence it is our intention to relate the four gênerai statements to some of 
the spécifie provisions in the Bill. In order to clarify this process we are 
offering a simple schéma. In constructing this schéma we hâve used Mr. 
Carr's « Eight Pillars of Wisdom » which constitute the essence of the 
Government's législative proposais. There are : 
i) the statutory right to belong, or not to belong to a trade union ; 
ii) the right to be recognised under certain conditions ; 
iii) the registration of unions ; 
iv) the presumption that ail collective agreements were legally 
binding unless on side contracted out ; 
v) some limitation on trade unions' total immunity from légal 
action in pursuit of damages ; 
vi) limited safeguards for the community, e.g. secret ballots in the 
event of a strike which would cause a national emergency ; 
vii) sélective enforceability of procédure agreements ; 
viii) machinery to regulate who should bargain for workers in parti-
cular factories - the « bargaining agency » proposai. n 
Thèse eight spécifie means can be set against the four gênerai ineans, as 
shown in Diagram 1.13 
il This list is, of course, indicative rather than comprehensive. Further, again to 
state the obvious, ail the items are interrelated. 
12 Extracted from The Times, 14th October 1970. 
13 This analysis is, of course, highly simplified since a two-dimentional approach 
is only partially adéquate to explain a complex network of interrelated variables. 
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Reform of the Collective Bargaining System 
Clearly, this is the fundamental purpose of the proposed législa-
tion. Ail the eight pillars are related in some way and degree to this 
underlying aim. A number of new controls over union activities are 
contained in the Bill of which, perhaps, the most significant is régis» 
tration. The Bill « . . . defines an organisation of workers . . . and pro-
vides a new définition of a trade union as an organisation of workers 
which is registered under (the) Bill with the Chief Registrar of Trade 
Unions and Employers' Associations » 14. The most important likely 
conséquence of this new légal définition 15 of a trade union is that in 
order to qualify for registration trade unions will be required to adapt 
their rules to certain « guiding principles ». Thèse principles are intended 
to affect the balance of power between the individual and his trade union. 
For example, the rule-books of registered unions must contain provisions 
to the effect that « the organisation must not arbitrarily or unreasonably 
exclude from membership anyone who is reasonably qualified to under-
take a kind of work ordinarily done by members of the union » 16. 
Secondly, « every member must hâve an equal right to hold office, to 
nominate candidates, to vote in élections or ballots, to attend meetings 
and to participate in the business of meetings - subject to reasonable 
rules determined by the organisation » 17. Thèse changes hâve a number 
of obvious implications. They include greater inter-union membership 
mobility (and hence greater compétition for members) and an easing of 
some of the institutional restrictions on labour mobility. However, in our 
view, it is unlikely that the provisions in Clause 61 will encourage greater 
participation from the rank-and-file since such is largely dépendent upon 
variables which cannot be controlled by statute. For example, Dr. Mc-
Carthy has found average branch attendance figures of 9 per cent and 
5 per cent respectively for two major trade unions (A.U.E.W. and 
N.U.G.M.W.)18. Other research has shown that only 24 per cent of a 
small sample of shop stewards in the East Midlands were opposed after 
14 Industrial Relations Bill, Explanatory and Financial Mémorandum. H.M.S.O., 
lst December 1970, page vi. 
15
 See Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Asso-
ciations, H.M.S.O., 1968 Cmnd 3623, page 205, para. 758 for the existing légal défi-
nition. 
!6 Industrial Relations Bill, Consultative Document, op. cit. page 13, para. 90. 
The more detailed légal provisions can of course be found in the published Bill, op. 
cit. Clause 61 (2) page 47. 
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their first year of office 19. Even in the extremely unlikely event of the 
existence of widespread restrictions on participation thèse low figures 
cannot be solely explained by such restrictions. 
Thèse are important implications of the registration proposais but 
they are much less significant than the fact that non-registered organisa-
tions will no longer be covered by the légal définition of a trade union 
and, consequently, will suffer ail the liabilities under the Act and will 
receive none of the Act's benefits. Thus, for example, officiais of non-
registered bodies will commit an « unfair industrial practice » if in con-
templation or furtherance of an industrial dispute they induce, or threaten 
to induce, another person to break a contract to which he is a party. It 
must be assumed that, for example, a strike called by a committee of 
shop stewards in a multi-union context will be an unfair industrial 
practice since the committee will presumably not be a registered trade 
union. A further assumption must be that a shop steward (or équivalent 
officer) of a registered union will also be prevented from inducing breach 
of contract, unless he is specifically authorised to do so (by the rule 
book). 20 In reality, it is unlikely that this authorisation will be forth-
coming since the unions would be required to give financial backing and, 
in any case, it is not certain that the Registrar would sanction the délé-
gation of such authority through the rule book. As far as national trade 
union officiais of non-registered trade unions are concerned, there will 
be no légal possibility of inducing a breach of contract. There would 
seem to be no possibility, in any circumstance, of circumventing the 
provision against inducement by giving strike notice since Clause 133 
of the Bill specifically prohibits this 21. 
Whilst registration is the key proposai in the reform of the collective 
bargaining System, other proposais are not without significance. For 
example, the Bill makes provision for the setting-up of bargaining units 
!7 Consultative Document, ibid. and the Bill ibid. Clause 61 (4). 
18
 Royal Commision an Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, Research 
Paper No. 1, The Rôle of Shop Stewards in British Industrial Relations, H.M.S.O. 
1967, page 39, para. 68. 
19 J.F.B. GOODMAN and T.G. WHITTINGHAM, Shop Stewards in British Industry 
MCGRAW HILL, page 94. This research related to a period during 1966 and 1967. 
20 Industrial Relations Bill, op. cit. Clause 148 (6) page 105. 
21 ibid., page 91. 
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and agents. « Clause 42 provides for an interested employer, one or more 
trade unions or the Secretary of State to présent to the Industrial Court 
an application that the Commission on Industrial Relations should be 
asked to examine questions relating to the définition of a bargaining unit 
and récognition of an organisation of workers or joint negotiating panel 
as sole bargaining agent with exclusive negotiating rights »22. Should 
the C.I.R. be required to intervene then, following its recommendations, 
the employer or the trade union(s) conceraed may apply to the N.I.R.C. 
to hâve the recommendations made legally binding, provided that the 
recommendations are supported by a majority of those voting in a ballot 
of those concerned, « . . . to be taken by the Commission or . . . under 
the supervision of the Commission by some other body » 23. 
Clearly, the Bill is addressing itself to an important problem. Pro-
fessor Clegg has given the most récent observation on this point and lists 
four gênerai criticisms in which the efficient conduct of industry is 
impeded by trade union structure : 
i) inter-union disputes which may be of two kinds - over démar-
cation and jurisdiction ; 
ii) leap-frogging wage claims ; 
iii) a multi-union situation giving rise to complications in plant 
relations ; 
iv) the effects of union démarcation lines on job organisation. 
He then notes that, « Most British industries can provide instances of 
one or more of thèse obstacles to efficiency arising out of union struc-
ture » 24. 
The question then is how far will this new quasi-legal rôle of the 
C.I.R. inhibit its effective functioning in this and other sphères? The 
T.U.C., not surprisingly, has strong views on this issue. « The Govern-
menfs proposai to make the C.I.R. part of the State apparatus makes 
22 Industrial Relations Bill, Explanatory and Financial Mémorandum, op. cit., 
page iv. 
23 ibid., Clause 46 (3), page 34. 
24 H. A. CLEGG, The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, BASIL 
BLACKÎWELL, 1970, p.. 66-67. 
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mutual respect meaningless and can only reduce the goodwill and support 
that the C.I.R. has so far received. It will seriously reduce the C.I.R.'s 
chances of exerting any influence over the pattern of industrial relations 
and of helping to get it improved.25 Whilst it is almost the conventional 
wisdom to lament over-lapping trade unionism, given the T.U.C.'s opposi-
tion to the rôle of the C.I.R. in this context we must express serious 
doubts as to the efficacy of the relevant proposais. Nevertheless, it may 
be that the prestige of the C.I.R. is sufficiently great for it to act as a 
successful marriage-broker in a voluntary situation and that recourse to 
the law may rarely arise. 
A further proposai needing some comment is that concerning legally 
binding agreements. « Clause 32 créâtes the presumption that any written 
collective agreement entered into after the commencement of the Act is 
intended by the parties to it to be a legally enforceable contract except in 
so far as it contains an express provision to the contrary. » 26 Whilst this 
Clause makes no distinction between substantive and procédural agree-
ments, we intend to examine both types although the procédural agreement 
will be discussed under those aspects of the Bill intended to curtail strike 
action. Concerning substantive agreements, the implications of the pro-
posais are highly spéculative since there is no élément of compulsion on 
the parties to be legally bound. Perhaps, in the event, certain factors may 
hâve to be présent to induce the parties to sign such agreements. Such 
factors could include such quid pro quos as the granting of substantial, 
possibly inflationary, wage increases in return for a fixed term, legally 
binding agreement. In such cases management would be able to plan ahead 
on the basis of greater knowledge of future short-term costs. A further 
possibility is that a productivity agreement could be negotiated as an alter-
native to a legally binding agreement or that a new hybrid will émerge -
the legally binding productivity agreement. Indeed, in our view, this hybrid 
is likely to occur quite frequently since fixed term legally binding agree-
ments will tend to hâve some productivity improvements, such as changes 
in wages structures, built in to them. 
Strengthening the Trade Unions 
There are a number of ways of measuring the « strength » of trade 
unions, but perhaps among the more significant, and certainly the more 
25 « Reason », T.U.C. November 1970, page 20. 
26 Industrial Relations Bill, Explanatory and Financial Mémorandum, op. cit. 
page iii. 
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easily measurable, is the « density of union membership ». 27, that is actual 
union membership expressed as a percentage of potential union member-
ship. In thèse terms there would appear to be much scope for strengthening 
the unions. This is particularly true of white-collar unions. Professor Bain 
states that, « In Britain only three out of ten white-collar workers belong 
to a trade union, whereas five out of ten manual workers are members » 28 
Generally, the biggest hindrance to trade unions in their attempts to recruit 
new members appears to be the unwillingness of employers to recognises 
unions for bargaining purposes. Consequently, one way of increasing their 
« strength » is to remove this hindrance. In this context, Professor Bain 
is again helpful when he « . . . suggests that white-collar unions will con-
tinue to grow in the future as a resuit of increasing employment concen-
tration, but that their growth will not be very great unless their récognition 
by employers is extended ».29 He further suggests, « . . . that the strength 
of thèse unions will generally not be sufficient in itself to persuade em-
ployers to concède récognition ; this will require the help of the govern-
ment. In short, the future growth of white-collar unionism in Britain is 
largely dépendent upon governement action to encourage union réco-
gnition ». 
Relating this situation to the Bill, Government actions is indeed 
proposed through the média of the bargaining unit and bargaining agency. 
Under thèse proposais, already discussed, a union or unions can seek 
récognition through the offices of the N.I.R.C. and the C.I.R. It is possible 
that many unions, especially white-collar unions and the white-collar 
sections of manual unions, will avail themselves of this opportunity.30 On 
the other hand, they may be wary of incurring the wrath of other unions 
by trying to establish a bargaining unit and agency for the puipose of 
securing récognition.31 
27
 For a discussion of this concept and its uses see Professor G. S. BAIN, The 
Growth of White-Collar Unionism, O.U.P. 1970, pp. 2-3. 
28 ibid. page 37. 
29 ibid. page 186. 
30
 Of course, only registered unions will be able to seek récognition in this way 
since, as stated above, non-registered unions will hâve no advantages under the 
Act but will incur ail the liabilities. 
31
 To be précise we must add that the C.I.R. may recommend a joint nego-
tiating panel as sole bargaining agent. Given this, unions may jointly apply for réco-
gnition and thus achieve an important objective without inter-union conflict. 
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It is appropriate at this stage to discuss the agency shop proposais. 
Thèse proposais were not explicity mentioned in Mr. Carr's « Eight 
pillars » and therefore are not separately included in Diagram 1. However, 
it can be argued that they are implied under the first of the spécifie means 
in the diagram, that is the statutory right to belong, or not to belong, to 
a trade union. 
Given its assumptions, the Government had, logically to pursue this 
matter to the point of abolishing the closed shop and replacing it by its 
version of the post-entry closed shop, that is the agency shop. Clause 7 
« makes void any provision in an agreement which purports to prevent 
the engagement of an employée who is not a member of a trade union or 
other organisation of workers or whose engagement has not been recom-
mended or approved by a trade union or other organisation of workers ».32 
According to the T.U.C., some 750,000 workers at présent covered by 
closed shop agreements, will be affected.33 Thèse workers will hâve to 
hâve their closed shop agreements renegotiated and replaced by agency 
shop agreements. Such agreements are defind as follows. « in this Act 
'agency shop agreement' means an agreement made between an employer 
and one or more trade unions whereby the employer agrées, in respect of 
workers of one or more descriptions specified in the agreement, that their 
ternis and conditions of employment shall include a condition that every 
such worker must either -
a) be or become a member of that trade union or of one of those 
trade unions, as the case may be, or 
b) agrée to pay appropriate contributions to that trade union, or 
(as the case may be) to one of those trade unions, in lieu of 
membership or (where permitted to do so in accordance with 
section 9 or section 10 of this Act) agrée to pay équivalent 
contributions to a charity. » 34 
The agency shop agreement differs from the présent post-entry 
closed shop agreement35 in a number of ways. Some of thèse are : 
i) Workers would hâve the right not to belong to a union but to 
pay contributions to the union (as though they were members) 
less optional extras. 
32 Industrial Relations Bill, op. cit. page i. 
33 « Reason » op. cit. page 14. 
34 Industrial Relations Bill, op. cit. Clause 1 1 ( 1 ) page 9. 
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ii) An agency shop would only corne into being following a ballot. 
In the ballot a majority of those eligible to vote, not those voting, 
must, to secure implementation, vote in favour of the agency 
shop36. 
iii) An agency shop would be legally binding for a minimum, period 
of two years. A corollary to this is that if the vote goes against 
the agency shop proposai the issue cannot be raised again for 
a minimum period of two years. 
Whatever the merits or demerits of thèse proposais in terms of 
individual rights, they would appear to weaken, rather than strengthen, 
the trade unions in collective bargaining. The abolition of the closed 
shop, whatever the case for or against this measure, must remove some 
power from the trade unions. Furthermore, given the fact that it is pos-
sible to opt out of trade union membership without undue difficulty in 
an agency shop situation, the proposais might, in some cases, undermine 
union bargaining strength. For example, if a substantial proportion of 
workers in an establishment opted out of membership then union leverage 
through sanctions would be diminished. 
In gênerai, the question of trade union bargaining power is important 
and it is not our intention, in this commentary, to take sides. Never-
theless, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the agency shop proposais 
will weaken rather than strengthen trade unions in collective bargaining. 
Curtailing Strike Action 
Certain parts of the Bill address themselves to the attempt to curb 
strike action 37. We hâve already discussed Clause 85 which proposes to 
35 At présent, according to the T.U.C., some 3,000,000 workers are now covered 
by post-entry closed shop («100 per cent union shops») agreements. «Reason» 
op. cit. page 15. 
36 Industrial Relations Bill, op. cit. Clause 13 (1) page 10. 
37 For purposes of simplification we use the word « strike » as a catch-ail. It is 
also intended to cover irregular action short of a strike. Thus, « In this Act 'irregular 
industrial action short of a strike' means any concerted course of conducts (other 
than a strike) which in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute -
a) is carried on by a group of workers with the intention of preventing, reducing 
or otherwise interfering with the production of goods or the provision of 
services, and 
b) In the case of some or ail of them, is carried on in breach of their contracts 
of employment. » 
Industrial Relations Bill, Claude 6 (2) page 5. 
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make it "an unfair industrial practice for anyone other than a trade union 
or employers' association or a person acting within the scope of his 
authority on behalf of such an organisation to induce or threaten to 
induce a breach of contract » 38. We can now turn to the « Emergency 
Procédures » contained in Part VIII of the Bill. Hence Clause 124 
« enables the Secretary of States to apply to the Industrial Court for an 
order if he considers that industrial action has begun (or is likely to begin) 
which is likely to endanger the national economy, national security, public 
health or public order, and that a continuance or deferment of the industrial 
action would be conducive to a settlement by négociation, councilation or 
arbitration » 39. Further, Clause 125 « empowers the Industrial Court to 
make an order directing that no person specified in the order shall call or 
support a strike or lock-out, or threaten to do so, for the period of the 
order (not exceeding 60 days). It sets out the matters which the Court 
is to consider before it makes an order, the items to be specified in the 
order, its scope and the steps to be taken to secure its effective applic-
ation » 40. 
Thèse are, on paper, far-reaching proposais which give to the Secre-
tary of State and the N.I.R.C. wide discretionary powers. Much dépends, 
of course, upon the frequency with which thèse clauses are invoked. If 
they are used sparingly, that is as a « long-stop », then there will be little 
change from the use of existing, non-statutory, procédures. However, if 
they are frequently invoked, it is possible that the remedy will be worse 
than the disease. On the gênerai use of the fixed cooling-off period the 
Donovan Commission has commented : « If the more rigid arrangements 
of the fixed cooling-off period had been used in their place (i.e. our 
existing flexible procédures) strikes might hâve taken place which were in 
fact avoided 41. The Commission in commenting on the use of compulsory 
strike ballots — a proposai which forms part of the Emergency Procé-
dures42 — has made a number of criticisms. Perhaps the two most 
relevant to the BilPs proposais are firstly that available évidence does 
38
 Industrial Relations Bill, page viii. 
39 Ibid. page xi. 
40 Ibid. 
41
 Royal Commission Report, op. cit. page 114 para. 424. 
42 See Industrial Relations Bill, Clauses 127-130, pages 87-90 for the detailed 
proposais. 
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not confirm the view that trade union members are less likely to vote for 
strike action than their leaders (évidence from the U.S.A. and Canada 
is quoted to support this view, as well as findings from their own work-
shop survey). Secondly, a vote in favour of strike action may haniper the 
freedom of action of trade union leaders to, for example, order a return 
to work43. 
Finally, under this heading, we now look at the measures to promote 
legally binding procédure agreements. Of course, this is only one aspect 
of the issue since legally binding substantive agreements may also con-
tribute towards the curtailment of strike action. We hâve already com-
mented on the highly spéculative implications of this proposai. Concern-
ing procédure agreements, the Government's intentions are quite clear. 
In referring to the absence of satisfactory procédure agreements in some 
sectors of industry, the Government has commented that, « In some 
cases this may be an important contributory factor to poor industrial 
relations. This possibility has led the Government to examine other 
proposais for securing the introduction of clear and legally enforceable 
procédural provisions »44. Thèse intentions are made operational in 
Clauses 35 and 39 of the Bill45. Clause 35, « enables the Secretary of 
State or any other person to whom it applies to make application to the 
Industrial Court for remédiai action where a procédure agreement is 
defective or does not exist, or where action is taken contrary to an agree-
ment. The clause lays down criteria for acceptance of such applications 
and empowers the Court to refer them for examination by the Com-
mission on Industrial Relations to détermine what defects exist and to 
recommend suitable remédies ». Clause 39 « enables the Industrial Court 
on application, subject to a time limit, from any employer or trade union 
covered by recommendation in a report under clause 38 to give the 
recommendations effect as a legally enforceable contract ». 
Once again, it seems that the rôle of the C.I.R. is likely to be crucial 
in obtaining the consent of the paries to the introduction of new procédure 
agreements and the improvement of existing agreements. If it proves to 
be unsuccessful in this rôle then the whole process is in danger of becom-
ing mechanistic with the law being used as a means of first rather than 
43
 Royal Commission Report, op. cit., page 114 paras. 428-429. 
44
 Consultative Document, op. cit., page 16, para. 118. 
45 Industrial Relations Bill, pp. iii and iv. 
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last resort. However, it is likely that the incidence of usage of thèse 
measures will be concentrated in those industries where procédure agree-
ments are a spécial problem 46. 
Finally, the procédure agreement proposai has attracted strong 
adverse comment from the T.U.C. « And the enforceable procédure agree-
ment might not just put the union under a légal obligation on the way 
disputes are handled, but could also put it under a légal obligation on 
how wages and conditions are to be negotiated. Then, if the union opposed 
that, it could be sued for damages for being in breach of something it 
had never agreed to and never wanted to hâve anything to do with »47. 
This point of view, whilts admittedly not disinterested, offers further 
support for our emphasis on the key importance of the rôle of the C.I.R. 
as an honest broker. 
Safeguarding Individual Rights 
Under this heading, the two most important provisions would seem 
to be the right to belong, or not to belong, to a trade union and the 
proposed safeguards against unfair dismissal. 
On the first provision the Bill says : « Every worker shall, as bet-
ween himself and his employer, hâve the following rights, that is to say — 
a) the right, if he so desires, to be a member of such trade union 
as he may choose ; 
b) subject to subsection (3) and (4) of this section, the right, if 
he so desires, to be a member of no trade union or other 
organisation of workers or to refuse to be a member of any 
particular trade union or other organisation of workers > 48. 
46 Evidence in support of this contention can be found in Professor H. A. 
TURNER'S IS Britain Really Strike-Prone ? C.U.P. 1969. Turner argues that the inci-
dence of industrial conflict (as measured by strikes) tends to be concentrated in 
spécifie firms in spécifie industries. Perhaps it should be added that such conflict 
inevitably stems from many causes of which an important one is often defective or 
non-existent procédure agreements. 
47 « Reason », op. cit. page 22. 
48 Industrial Relations Bill, Clause 5 ( 1 ) page 3. 
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The Bill then goes on in the same clause to make it an unfair industrial 
practice for an employer, or anyone acting on his behalf, to interfère with 
thèse rights. This is obviously a direct reflection of the Government's 
basic philosophy and leads on to the rights of individual participation in 
union affairs and the closed and agency shop provisions. Thèse we hâve 
already discussed. A discussion of such issues is not really possible hère 
since the view one takes reflects the long, historical debate over the 
nature of rights and obligations in démocratie societies. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the T.U.C.'s outright rejection of the proposai to give 
people the right to belong or not to belong to a trade union. « The non-
unionist is a ' free rider ' who takes ail the benefits of collective negoti-
ations, makes no contribution of any kind, plays no part in the machinery, 
and accepts none of the obligations of a union member » 49. 
Finally, under this heading, we discuss the unfair dismissal proposais. 
The Government intends that employées shall hâve the right of appeal to 
an industrial tribunal against unfair dismissal50. The Bill « sets out the 
criteria for determining whether a dismissal is fair or unfair ». Hence, 
« . . . the dismissal of an employée shall be regarded as having been fair 
if the reason for it (or, if more than one, the principal reason) — 
49
 «Reason..», op cit., page 13. 
50 Hère it is appropriate to give a brief outline of the légal machinery proposed. 
There will be two types of court, the National Industrial Relations Court and the 
Industrial Tribunals. The N.I.R.C. will deal with cases arising from disputes between 
organisations — trade unions, employers and employers' associations. It will sit in 
divisions and can operate in différent parts of the country. In every case, it will be 
presided over by a triumvirate of a legally qualified chairman and two lay assessors 
with « relevant industrial relations expérience ». Appeal will lie to the Court of 
Appeal and then the House of Lords. 
The Industrial Tribunals, which already exist but with more limited functions, 
will examine disputes between individuals and organisations. Again, the triumvirate 
approach will be used and appeal will lie to be N.I.R.C. in the first instance, followed 
by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. Both the N.I.R.C. and the Tribunals 
would be able : 
« - to award compensation 
- to détermine the rights of a part 
- to make orders to refrain from unfair industrial action 
- to make speedy but temporary orders. 
The N.I.R.C. would hâve power to enforce any of thèse orders ». 
(Consultative Document, op. cit., page 5, para. 30.) 
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a) related to the capability or qualifications of the employée for 
performing work of the kind which he was employed by the 
employer to do, or 
b) related to the conduct of the employée, or 
c) was that the employée was redundant, or 
d) was that the employée could not continue to work in the position 
which he held without contravention (either on his part or on 
that of this employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or 
under an enactment » 51. 
This part of the Bill does, in fact, belatedly bring British practice into 
line with other advanced, industrial countries. As Andrew Shonfield 
pointed out, in 1965, « The whole trend in European law in récent years, 
except in Britain, has been to put employers increasingly under the 
necessity of providing évidence to show why the dismissal of a worker 
in any particular case was unavoidable » 52. A similar protective, légal 
situation is to be found in the U.S.A. 53 It should be noted, however, that 
the proposed protection only applies after two years continuous employ-
ment, except for dismissal for reasons of membership or non-membership 
of a trade union or for participation in trade union activities. This will 
be a temporary measure, « because of limitations on the rate at which 
the Industrial Tribunals can be expanded for their additional func-
tions » 54. 
One important aspect of the unfair dismissal proposais is that the 
onus rests with the employée to show unfair dismissal which may deter 
some individuals from seeking the protection of the law. 
Finally, it is possible that some employers may week to by-pass the 
légal machinery by offering aggrieved employées straight cash payments. 
A pointer to such possible situation was recently reported in « The 
Times ». A nationally-known company ended a seven-week strike over 
51 Industrial Relations Bill, page iii and Clause 22 (1) pp. 15-16. 
52 Modem Capitalism, O.U.P. 1965, page 114. 
53 See Théodore KHEEL, « What Future for the Industrial Relations Bill ? » 
Times Business News, 2nd November, 1970. 
54 Consultative Document, op. cit., pp. 7-8, para. 53. 
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a man's dismissal by paying his family « rehabilitation money ». As that 
newspaper's reporter pointed out, « A précèdent has been established, 
which other employers wishing to by-pass the elaborate (and expensive) 
légal machinery being established by the Government, will not be slow to 
appreciate » 55. Further instances may foliow this financial précèdent in 
cases where employées are seeking the maximum compensation under 
the Bill, that is £4,160 — 104 weeks at £40 per week. 
Conclusions 
Without doubt, the Government has presented a set of proposais 
which are as clear as one could expect in the complex field of industrial 
relations. Of course, interprétation of the future Act will play an import-
ant part in the ultimate outcome and hence a corpus of case law will 
émerge to guide the participants in industrial relations. 
Assessing, with any précision, the ultimate implications of a Bill is 
obviously very difficult. Such tentative conclusions as we offer are there-
fore based upon a leading, disinterested observer of the British scène. 
Théodore Kheel, a prominent American mediator, has contributed a 
detailed critical comparison of the Government's proposais (in the Con-
sultative Document) with U.S. practice56. Writing in « The Times 
Business News » 57, Kheel indicates the validity of the comparison when 
he points out that « The Government's model.. . relies heavily on three 
American laws on labour relations » (Wagner Act 1935, Taft-Hartley 
Act 1947, and the Landum-Griffin Act 1959). 
Our reading of Kheel suggests four major Unes of criticism : 
a) Viable labour agreements need more than légal enforceability, 
they primarily need the mutual respect and consent of the 
parties. This point would appear to hâve especial relevance to 
the proposai to allow the N.I.R.C., on the application of one of 
parties, the power to make a procédure agreement legally 
binding. 
55 By Paul ROUTLEDGE, 30th December, 1970. 
56 To ail intents and purposes, with some generally minor exceptions, the Bill 
is a mirror-image of the Consultative Document, although much less readable ! 
57 Théodore KHEEL, op. cit., 2nd November, 1970. 
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b) Under the proposais it seems too easy to eliminate the agency 
shop (after two years, 20 per cent of employées covered by 
the agreement, or the employer, can seek a secret ballot to 
reverse the agreement). The fréquent élimination of agency 
shop situation could seriously weaken the financial standing of 
British trade unions. Hère it should be remembered that British 
unions are notoriously poor, especially when compared with 
their U.S. counterparts. 
c) The proposais, in making a distinction between registered trade 
unions and other organisations, may well resuit in isolating the 
leaders of unconstitutional strikes which may succeed in alienat-
ing thèse leaders. For example, the leaders of a registered trade 
union might, to avoid liability in law 58, use their best endeavours 
to dissuade local leaders from illégal actions. Such action could 
well widen the gap between national and local leaders and 
hence encourage, rather than inhibit, future illégal actions. 
d) Finally, the Government's législative ambitions may be too 
great. It took three Acts (from 1935 to 1959) for the Americans 
to introduce broadly similar législation. « . . . the Government 
proposes in one Industrial Relations Bill to eliminate the légal 
immunity that has existed for almost a hundred years and to 
correct practically ail of the ills that hâve cropped up during 
that period of time ». 
UNE ANALYSE DE LA NOUVELLE LOI BRITANNIQUE 
SUR LES RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 
L'adoption, en décembre 1970, d'une nouvelle loi sur les relations industrielles 
en Angleterre a marqué de façon définitive, un nouveau départ pour le système de 
relations industrielles de ce pays. L'analyse des intentions du gouvernement sous-
jacente à cette législation peut être divisée en trois parties : un examen de sa philo-
58 Although there will be statutory limits to be compensation payable by 
registered unions, thèse limits may still be inhibitory and induce the «best endea-
vours » route. The limits are : 
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP COMPENSATION LIMIT ( £ ) 
up to and including 4,999 5,000 
5,000 to 24,999 25,000 
25,000 to 99,999 50,000 
100,000 and over 100,000 
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sophie, les buts qui découlent de cette philosophie et les moyens choisis pour atteindre 
ces objectifs. 
Deux courts commentaires suffiraient pour résumer la philosophie du gouverne-
ment lors de l'adoption de cette loi. D'abord, nous assistons à une extension du rôle 
de la loi en société démocratique vers un domaine presqu'entièrement exclu dans 
le passé : en second lieu, cette philosophie est en quelque sorte un nouveau départ 
radical - radical à cause de l'intervention de la loi dans un sous-système de la société 
dans lequel elle n'avait précédemment joué qu'un rôle très mineur avec le consente-
ment général des parties impliquées. Quant à l'objectif fondamentale de cette nouvelle 
loi, il apparaît clairement qu'elle a pour but de renforcer l'économie. On a beaucoup 
mentionné les objectifs économiques et très peu parlé des buts sociaux de cette légis-
lation. Ces derniers seraient d'établir des normes nationales pour de meilleures rela-
tions industrielles, de protéger ceux qui se conforment à ces normes, de protéger les 
droits individuels au travail et de fournir de nouvelles méthodes de solution des 
conflits du travail. 
Quant aux moyens utilisés pour atteindre ces objectifs, notons que la réforme 
du système de négociation collective, le renforcement du syndicalisme, la diminution 
des grèves et la protection des droits individuels sont les principaux. Plus spécifique-
ment, citons le droit d'appartenir ou de ne pas appartenir à un syndicat, le droit 
d'être reconnu sous certaines conditions, l'enregistrement des syndicats, la présomp-
tion que toutes les conventions collectives sont contractuelles à moins qu'une des 
deux parties fasse de la sous-traitance, quelques limites à l'immunité totale des 
syndicats face aux poursuites légales en matière de dommages, quelques mécanismes 
de protection pour la communauté comme, par exemple, les votes secrets lors des 
grèves qui pourraient mettre en danger l'intérêt national, une mise en application 
sélective des conventions et des mécanismes qui ont pour but de contrôler qui va 
négocier pour les travailleurs dans certaines usines. 
Le gouvernement britannique a présenté un ensemble de propositions qui sont 
aussi claires qu'on pourrait s'y attendre à l'intérieur du domaine complexe des rela-
tions industrielles. Il est évident que l'interprétation de la future loi jouera un rôle 
important dans le résultat ultime. Une jurisprudence émergera qui guidera les parti-
cipants au système de relations industrielles. 
Évaluer avec précision les conséquences ultimes d'une loi est évidemment très 
difficile. Les conclusions partielles que nous offrons sont alors basées sur les opinions 
d'observateurs désintéressés de la réalité anglaise. Un célèbre médiateur américain, 
Théodore Kheel, a comparé les propositions du gouvernement à la pratique améri-
caine. Kheel justifie la comparabilité des deux réalités en avançant que le modèle 
britannique empruntait à trois lois américaines du travail, à savoir la Loi Wagner 
de 1935, le Taft-Hartley de 1947 et le Landum-Griffin de 1959. 
Notre interprétation de Kheel suggère quatre critiques importantes : 
a) La loi à elle seule, ne suffit pas pour garantir de véritables conventions 
collectives : celles-ci ont d'abord besoin du respect mutuel et du consentement des 
parties impliquées. Cet argument semble être très pertinent lorsque l'on considère 
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la proposition de donner à la Commission nationale des relations du travail, à la 
demande des deux parties, le pouvoir de rendre un accord obligatoire. 
b) Après examen des propositions, il semble trop facile d'éliminer le précompte 
syndical généralisé (P.S.G.) (après 2 ans, 20% des employés couverts par la con-
vention, ou l'employeur, peuvent demander un vote secret afin d'annuler la conven-
tion). L'élimination fréquente du P.S.G. pourrait sérieusement affaiblir la position 
financière des syndicats britanniques. Il faut se rappeler que les syndicats anglais 
sont notoirement pauvres surtout lorsqu'on les compare aux unions américaines. 
c) Les propositions qui touchent la distinction entre les syndicats enregistrés et 
les autres organisations peuvent facilement entraîner l'isolation des meneurs des 
grèves illégales, grèves qui peuvent réussir à aliéner ces leaders. Par exemple, les 
chefs d'un syndicat enregistré peuvent pour éviter la responsabilité légale, dissuader 
les leaders locaux de recourir à des actions illégales. De telles pratiques peuvent 
facilement élargir l'écart entre les chefs nationaux et locaux et, par le fait même, 
encourager plutôt que le contraire de futures actions illégales. 
d) Finalement, on doit noter que les ambitions législatives du gouvernement 
britannique sont peut-être trop grandes. Les Américains ont eu besoin de trois lois 
entre 1935 et 1959 pour introduire une législation à peu près similaire. Le gouverne-
ment se propose à l'intérieur d'une seule loi de relations industrielles d'éliminer l'im-
munité légale qui existe depuis presque 100 ans et de corriger presque tous les maux 
qui sont apparus durant cette période. 
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